讲座题目： Misreporting Demand Information

报告人：香港城市大学商学院 李曦助理教授

时 间：  2019年12月23日（周一）下午2点30分

地 点：  Myball迈博体育官方网站313会议室

内容简介：

 In this study, we investigate information sharing in a distribution channel in which the retailer possesses superior information about market demand. Departing from the existing literature on information sharing which assumes that information sharing must be truthful, we allow the retailer to manipulate and misreport its demand information for its benefit at an information manipulation cost. We find that the retailer's ability to manipulate information has substantial effects on the equilibrium outcome: when the cost of manipulation is low, the retailer cannot help but to deflate its demand forecast (even if the actual demand is high) to convince the manufacturer to offer it a low wholesale price. When the cost of manipulation is moderate, the retailer, in the case of high demand, randomizes between misreporting and truthful reporting. Finally, when the cost of manipulation is high, the retailer never misreports its demand information. While the manufacturer's profit increases with the manipulation cost, the retailer's profit is nonmonotone with this cost. At first, it decreases but only up to a certain point, after which the effect is reversed. Within a certain parameter space, the retailer's ability to manipulate information hurts both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits, thereby creating a lose-lose situation. Collectively, these results underscore the significant effects of information manipulation in distribution channel management.

学者简介：

李曦，香港城市大学商学院市场营销系助理教授。于加拿大多伦多大学，香港科技大学，清华大学分别获得市场营销学博士，运营管理硕士，计算机科学学士学位。目前主要从事运营管理与营销学，经济学等交叉学科方向研究。迄今为止，以第一作者或独立作者在多个国际顶级（UTD 24）以及一流学术期刊，如Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing Research, and International Journal of Research in Marketing发表多篇学术成果。

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